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Abstract: Like Freud’s famous inquiry ‘what does a woman want?’, this paper 
asks a similar question of the signifier ‘feminism’ for if one aims to (re)imagine 
feminism for the new millennium one must first ask: what does Feminism want? 
This (imperfect) reference to Freud’s question hopes to draw attention to the 
particular and the universal underpinning the signifier feminism, a slipperiness 
that works idiosyncratically at the threshold of public and private politics 
which, though it is perhaps the most unifying aspect of feminism, nevertheless 
undermines it. To politicize the personal one must question the signifier that 
comes to universalize an indefinite article for, as I argue in this paper, what ‘a’ 
woman wants is beneath the bar of what Feminism wants when it is mounted 
in public discourse. To continue to invest publically in a signifier of personal 
politics—as Jacqueline Rose advocates (2014)—then, one must rephrase the 
question: of what does this signifier Feminism speak when it is mounted in 
public discourse? This paper considers some mechanisms by which this signifier 
generates and mobilizes desire, fantasy, and phobia in public politics where 
feminism’s knowledge product covers over or, in Rose’s terms, “sanitizes” those 
“disturbing insight[s]” (2014: x) of experience, “everything that is darkest, most 
recalcitrant and unsettling” (2014 xii), in the “furthest limits of conscious and 
unconscious life” (2014: x). Here, where this signifier constitutes an ideal-ego, 
its effects are inhibiting. In short, this paper argues that before any future of 
feminism can be imagined, those occupying a feminist position—discourse, 
politics, or identity—must ask what their unconscious investment in this signifier 
is. In Lacanian terms, one must relinquish feminism’s discourse of protest and 
complete the circuit through the analyst’s discourse to ask: what does a woman 
want in feminism? 
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A Question for a Future Feminism
It is time to return to what feminism has to tell us. It is time to make 
the case for what women have uniquely to say about the perils of 
our modern world. But the case cannot be made along the lines that 
have become most familiar. 
—Jacqueline Rose, Women in Dark Times.
“What can it mean to be feminist today and further, what could a possible future 
for feminism look like?” My response to this special edition call for papers—
and indeed, my response to Roses’ sentiments upon which it is based—is 
intentionally provocative. I argue that it is not what feminism has to tell us that 
is most important to any future in which it plays a part but, on the contrary, 
a question of what the investment in this signifier is for any individual that is 
essential to any reimagining of feminist theory or praxis. In this I agree with 
Rose that “the case” for feminism’s future “cannot be made along the lines that 
have become most familiar” but I go further to suggest that if we are to address 
those “disturbing insight[s]” of experience, “everything that is darkest, most 
recalcitrant and unsettling,” in the “furthest limits of conscious and unconscious 
life,” feminism is not the tool with which to do it.1 Indeed, where feminism has 
been institutionalized as a discourse of knowledge, and in some instances, 
comes to constitute an ideal-ego for a subject, I suggest that its effect is not 
merely one (as Rose suggests), of “sanitisation” but one of inhibition: that is 
to say, that feminism has come to form a super-ego injunction that inhibits—
increasingly evident in the conflicted impasses around sexuality and sexuation 
in the West’s “post-feminist” times, as I have explored elsewhere.2 It is the 
argument of this paper that before feminism can be mobilized anew it must 
first address the particularity with which this signifier Feminism (capital ‘F’) is 
invested—at the level of the personal and political—through analysis. 
 In some respects this approach mimics Rose’s own analysis of Marilyn 
Monroe, as signifying or coming to stand in for something not fully conscious in 
the American dream.3 Rose suggests that what makes Monroe’s public figure so 
arresting is her refusal to hide her internal suffering—her quest in the “struggle to 
be fully human”—and in this I agree that Monroe provides a compelling lesson for 
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feminists as they broach a new millennium.4 In particular, Monroe’s relationship 
to the film gaze—that is, the gaze invested with partial drives: the gaze of 
desire—that manifests so centrally and problematically in her life parallels a 
deep preoccupation within feminist discourses regarding the representation and 
function of women in the scheme of desire that serves to limit a question of their 
own desire. And though Monroe might be said to parallel feminism’s questioning 
discourse (that effects a protest discourse), her protest is most striking for its 
double movement: it was not simply that she did not (or could not) hide her 
internal suffering, but that she allowed this to be exposed while simultaneously 
striving (self-consciously) to perfect a feminine masquerade that never seemed 
to be undermined by such questioning. In this dedication to the public image 
of her feminine persona, the most significant aspect of what Monroe has to 
offer feminism is arguably overlooked: while Monroe protested in her double 
movement, she nevertheless entered into a mode of analysis and raised the 
question: “what is my desire?” or, in light of Monroe’s recall to the Freudian/
Apollonic adage “know thyself,” her question might be better phrased “what is 
my truth?”5 For some, Monroe might thus represent the quintessential image 
of psychoanalysis of interest to feminists in the question: what does a woman 
want?6 Freud’s famous question to Marie Bonaparte has long-since entered into 
popular cultural parlance through film, television, and music, and often now 
functions as a cynical (postmodern) reference to Freud’s unconscious patriarchal 
tendencies. Yet as Lacan notes, this question is often misquoted as “what does 
Woman want?” such that it poses a question at the level of a universal “Woman” 
rather than a particular subject, and further observes that Freud’s question is, 
rather, about “[a] woman. Not just any woman.”7 
 In response to this special edition of Continental Theory and Thought 
regarding feminisms future, the provocative title of this paper poses a similarly 
impossible question as that attributed to Freud: what does feminism want? 
The aim of this question is to show where that signifier Feminism functions 
to universalize the particular, and thus to argue that it potentially does so to 
(regressively) defend against the question of an individual subject’s desire. By 
working through this provocation, I want to consider what goes unanalyzed in 
the relationship between the universal and the particular central to the feminist 
praxis of making the personal political, and ask more properly: what does a 
woman want in feminism? Where feminism has come to structure a speaking 
position within public discourse, it cannot be said to speak for itself but, rather, 
speak of a woman’s desire, fear, or fantasy.8 Therefore, if feminism is to move 
forward it must, I suggest, first pass through an analysis. 
 To bring psychoanalytic insight to bear on feminist discourse and praxis 
is provocative, at least in terms of the direction of the analytic questioning. For 
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the most, the direction of the dialogue between psychoanalysis and feminism 
has been to ask what feminists (such as de Beauvoir or Irigaray) have to offer 
psychoanalysis—feminine or feminist critique and revision—rather than what 
psychoanalysis has to offer feminism. Mitchell’s famous proclamation that what 
psychoanalysis offers feminism is a precise illustration of the status quo to be 
dismantled (or at the very least, worked with), shows us the limit of this direction 
in the dialogue: psychoanalysis is only useful in articulating something of 
patriarchal structures (and their reproduction), as evidenced in what is perhaps 
one of the most popularly known feminist theoretical concepts: Laura Mulvey’s 
“male gaze.”9 Mulvey’s famous essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” 
follows Mitchell’s call and boldly claims psychoanalytic theory “as a political 
weapon” to “advance our understanding of the status quo, of the patriarchal 
order in which we are caught”10—specifically, to advance our knowledge of the 
mechanisms of the eroticized gaze harnessed in narrative cinema of a certain 
era. Yet somewhat tellingly while Mulvey’s essay articulates the structure of an 
eroticized gaze—a male viewing position structured on a woman as the object 
of desire—it does little to address the position of the one “caught” in this gaze, 
or to use psychoanalysis to understand what is at stake when one is the object 
of a gaze. That is, feminism has largely ignored what psychoanalysis has to tell 
us about women, which is assumed to be both inaccurate (imagined to be what 
men or patriarchy has to say about women), and, notably, universalizing (the 
presumption that what psychoanalysis has to say about women is not about 
the particularity of the individual in analysis but, rather, all women). Perhaps 
this is a consequence of early feminist interventions into psychoanalytic theory, 
such as de Beauvoir’s critical dismissal of Freud; her famous dictum that “one is 
not born, but rather becomes, a woman” certainly set the precedent for post-
structuralist feminists like Butler to dismantle this category “woman” in whose 
name feminism is mobilized.11 As I have previously noted, Butler’s disarticulation 
of “woman” means such engagements between feminism and psychoanalysis 
have long-since been foreclosed despite Butler herself continuing to engage 
with psychoanalytic theory—that is, Butler functions for many feminists as a 
justification for rejection of psychoanalysis—and while Mulvey’s theory continues 
to function as a mainstay of film theory (pedagogically entrenched in the 
curriculum and regularly cited in digital feminist praxis) there is little feminist 
interest in what Freud, Lacan, or any psychoanalyst might have to say about 
women today in or out of theory.12 This paper seeks to reopen this dialogue and 
discard the assumptions made along the former lines of feminist enquiry, indeed, 
it argues that psychoanalysis is essential to any future feminist project. 
 We cannot categorically ask what feminism wants when it is structured 
as a politics of the personal inhabited by idiosyncratic subjects (hence 
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intersectional theory), but when a subject speaks from the feminist discursive 
position or mounts it in public discourse, an import question must first be 
made conscious: what does a subject want in feminism? We cannot answer this 
question categorically either, but we can consider how such investments are 
commonly animated, and this paper takes a central feminist concept widely and 
popularly articulated in public discourse—Laura Mulvey’s “male gaze” theory—to 
consider the ways in which this feminist theory is animated in the question of 
what a woman wants when it is mounted in public discourse and, moreover, to 
ask how it forms a limit to the question of a woman’s desire. From here we might 
then ask: what does feminism want when it comes to signify what a woman 
wants? 
The Universal and the Particular 
To understand this relationship I put forward for analysis, between feminism and 
individual (feminist) desire, we must address the problem of the particular and 
the universal where it underscores feminist praxis and, just as problematically, 
where psychoanalytic theory built upon the clinic is applied in a theoretical 
analysis. Rose points out that feminism only speaks for “some women” and 
should never “claim to speak on behalf of all women,” yet claims to the 
contrary are becoming increasingly vocal in digital feminist media—such as the 
hashtag “#YesAllWomen”—suggesting this issue remains unresolved in much 
contemporary feminism.13 Nevertheless, the question of a particular female 
desire has been at the center of feminist debates about the representational 
strategies used to depict women in media cultures. Yet here the possibilities 
of animating an “authentic” female/feminine desire remains entangled in the 
problem of the universal.14 Following the protests of de Beauvoir, Irigaray, 
and others, contemporary feminists protest being represented—theorized 
and thought of—according to patriarchal structures, or phallocentric models 
of desire.15 It is a common theme in much feminist criticism of post-feminist 
women to point out that their sexual enjoyment is “mimicking” possession of a 
phallus and is thus not authentically female, yet it remains unclear in much of 
this literature what this universal female desire would look like or structurally 
be otherwise.16 In this instance feminist criticism and theory remains stuck at 
the level of protest, and by maintaining the question of female desire at the 
level of a universal, one elides the truth at the level of the particular. To suggest 
feminism needs is psychoanalysis is not, however, to suggest that psychoanalysis 
can tell us something of woman’s truth but, rather, of the particular truth of any 
subject. The call to psychoanalysis I am advocating through this paper then, is 
one that locates it at the level of a woman, in praxis. Bracher notes that where 
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“psychoanalysis” is deployed as a theoretical tool within the humanities it often 
comes to function “as an end in itself—that is, as a truth discourse functioning 
as a fortress to inhabit and display, or a s a weapon with which to colonize other 
subjects or discourses” that all too often functions “as a body of knowledge to 
be developed, validated, or celebrated as the bearer of one’s identity.”17 It is this 
application of psychoanalytic theory that feminist theory and discourses have 
rejected but, I argue, it is the “psychoanalytic process,” as Bracher argues, that 
continues to be useful. 
 In seminar VII, Lacan situates desire at the level of the particular where, 
in analysis, the subject seeks to relieve suffering by coming to understand 
what Lacan calls a “liberating truth” but cautions this truth is not a universal 
“superior law” “beyond the subject” but, rather, as “a truth that frees” it is “a 
particular truth”—an “intimate specificity”—to be found “in a hiding place in 
our subject.”18 Characterized as a Freudian Wunsch (what Evans notes is more 
properly translated as “desire” in Lacan’s work as it denotes “a continuous 
force”), the “particularity” of this truth is universal only in its presences “in every 
human being.”19 More importantly for our purposes of subjecting the signifier 
Feminism—and a woman’s investment in it—to analysis, is to consider the 
question of desire. This question of desire is not the identification of an object, 
but a question regarding the ways a subject’s desire is inhibited by a demand 
from without: a super-ego injunction—that is, by the demands of a social group 
or any sovereign Good at its helm. How will one act on their desire within and 
against the super-ego’s command/demand to limit pleasure and enjoyment? This 
is what Bracher argues is the value of psychoanalytic theory: to be applied “as a 
means” of helping “individuals achieve recovery and integration of a previously 
excluded elements of the self” where such elements may have been subject to 
repressive forces. That is, analysis draws on theory but only so as to tool with 
which to untangle from those inhibiting forces the subject’s particular truth.
 For female subjects (or those identifying with a woman’s plight) the 
demands of the social group are increasingly framed by feminist knowledge. 
Where the ideas of second wave feminisms have grown in public consciousness 
and increasingly shape public discourse—what it is permissible to say and do qua 
sexuation—feminist discourses can take on a super-egoical demand, particularly, 
as I have previously suggested, where feminist discourses promote an inflated 
morality akin to a Sovereign Good (as I will expand on later).20 In this, feminist 
knowledge might be said to operate as a type of “duty,” and the response of 
feminists to any woman or sympathetic subject who rejects feminism hints at 
the ferocity of this demand: the logic of refusing feminist knowledge cannot be 
imagined, one must simply not understand what feminism is/wants/does/should 
be.21 I want to suggest that this feminist imperative forecloses the task of analysis 
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by instituting the very super-ego demand upon the subject that presents itself in 
analysis where, as Lacan puts it, “the ‘I’ which asks itself what it wants” attempts 
to resolve the dilemma of “submit[ting] itself to the duty that if feels within” 
which appears from without, as a “strange, paradoxical, and cruel command.”22 
Though Monroe was largely unsuccessful in her attempts at analysis,23 to ask 
the question of one’s desire is, many might argue, precisely what generates 
feminist inquiry and in this, feminist protest and questioning has been equated 
with the discourse of the hysteric.24 Indeed, the fundamental question at the 
heart of second wave feminism animates the hysteric’s ultimate question: what 
is a woman?25 The results of a properly feminist questioning would appear, at 
least in some expressions of post-feminist culture, to have resulted in a world 
dominated by feminist ideas. At the institutional level feminist knowledge is 
implicated in a range of social, political, and regulatory structures and processes. 
Perhaps more obviously, spectacles of female agency and desire are promoted 
among other imperatives to enjoy in neoliberal cultures of self-promotion.26 Yet, 
as many cultural theorists suggest, expressions of post-feminism (depending 
on how one defines the ‘post’) always operate—somewhat like Monroe—in a 
double movement between traditional articulations of femininity and feminism.27 
Which is to say, that when one speaks from a feminist position of knowledge, the 
feminine question is expressed beneath the bar, and as Lacan notes, “as soon 
as you ask the question ‘What does a woman want?’ you locate the question at 
the level of desire, and everyone knows that, for woman, to locate the question 
at the level of desire is to question the hysteric.”28 That is, where the theory is 
mobilized in this way that places so much emphasis on the master’s desire (at 
the expense of a woman’s), it might be said to be an expression of hysterical 
discourse. I have previously argued that feminist discourses—as a form of 
hysterical protest—have bypassed the analyst’s discourse and moved into the 
university discourse where feminist knowledge production is taken as truth; 
here feminism’s knowledge product can intervene into the subject’s affective 
reality and provide a (seemingly legitimate) name for affect.29 But in doing so, I 
suggest, it Feminism as a signifier—of identity, knowledge, and universal truth—
not only intervenes into the subject’s affects but defends against them and 
obstruct efforts towards (self) analysis. 
 But if feminism speaks from the position of the hysteric’s discourse 
articulated in Lacan’s seminar XVII, it is useful to remember that the speaking 
agent is “caused to act” from the operative function of  “truth” beneath the 
bar: object a (see Figure 1 and 2). For the hysteric, this is object a, but like the 
product of the hysteric’s discourse (the bottom right position in the matheme), it 
signifies beneath the bar. 
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Figure 1: The discourse of the hysteric from Jacques Lacan’s The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Russell Grigg. Edited 
by Jacques-Alain Miller. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007). 69. 
agent  →       other  
truth           production
Figure 2: The formula of discourse, in Jacques Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book XX: Encore, on Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973. 
Translated by Bruce Fink. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1999), 17.
If feminism is not to “sanitize” itself then, it is at the level of a subject that the 
truth causing the agent to act be uncovered, and where feminist theory may 
occlude—inhibit, shape, or give a name to—this truth, any question of feminisms 
future must address the signifier Feminism in this function. That is, it becomes 
essential to distinguish what this signifier Feminism speaks of at the level of the 
Symbolic and Imaginary signification. Lacan notes that the Symbolic is linked 
to language where what signifies of language is shared, but when one begins 
to deal with “projections, introjections, expulsions, [and] reintrojections of bad 
objects” including the subject’s own “sadism” “coming back from these objects” 
that we find signification “in the domain of the Imaginary.”30 Such significations 
might be recognized in the reactive work of feminist theory and praxis in the 
field of desire.
 The frequency with which Mulvey’s concept of the male gaze is invoked 
in popular culture and public discourses would suggest it has become one of 
the most widely recognized forms of feminist criticism. The influence of this 
theory in feminisms public discourse is notable in the amount of popular media 
culture that directly animates it and, increasingly, its reversal: advertising, 
film, and television all play with a reversal of women’s “to-be-looked-at-ness” 
in the studied presentation of a female gaze onto an eroticized male object 
(from sketch-parodies to full productions such as Magic Mike), and there is 
broad public acceptance (in the West at least) of erotic literature for women 
epitomized in the 50 Shades of Gray phenomenon, that parallels the growth 
in pornography produced for a female viewer. The question of authenticity 
is subsequently raised in response, and much of this media culture can be 
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compared to the production of a more politically mobilized feminist gaze 
in counter-cultural spaces—there is a marked difference between ‘porn for 
women,’ for instance, and ‘feminist porn’: while the former responds to the 
market, that latter animates a libido at the service of politics. In addition to its 
political gesture, I suggest, this feminist gaze functions, as a defence against the 
question of a woman’s particular desire rather than its uninhibited animation. 
That is, where Rose suggests feminism must confront the unconscious desires 
of women, we instead see expressions of feminist desire as distorted reactions 
against phallic desire. As a hysterical protest, expressions of feminist desire 
follow the hysteric in offering “a teaching about the object and the fundamental 
fantasy,”31 for what is striking about hysterical protest is the ‘relative’ truth of 
what is produced as knowledge beneath the bar. The hysteric’s discourse is “not 
a question of the truth of facts […] but of the truth that determines motives, 
that defines what torments the subject.”32 Here feminism becomes a signifier 
that metonymically stands in for what is beneath the bar of a woman when she 
invokes feminist discourse.
What does a woman want in feminist theory? 
While we cannot speculate on what every woman wants with feminist theory, 
Mulvey’s ‘male gaze’ theory offers a prominent example of the ways in which 
feminist theory is mobilized politically where it cathects to personal affect, 
and this section seeks to explore some of the ways it has done so in response 
to Aronofsky’s 2010 film Black Swan. The film follows the story of an ascetic 
ballerina who, upon finally realizing her ambition of dancing the coveted dual 
role of Odette/Odile in the classical ballet Swan Lake, has a psychotic break and 
stabs herself during her triumphant debut performance. The film is striking in 
its self-conscious engagement with the male gaze through a host of cinematic 
techniques of looking typically associated with the dramatization of women in 
Hollywood film and the genres that animate female Oedipal dramas, longings, 
paranoia, and anxiety, such as the woman’s weepy, melodrama, Gothic horror, 
and psycho-sexual-thriller. The film’s melodramatic excesses, preponderance 
of doppelgängers, and techniques of visual paranoia somewhat polarized 
feminist critics, many of who were particularly hostile towards these cinematic 
techniques even while expressing uneasy enjoyment in the film. The story of an 
impossibly naïve classical ballet dancer living an ascetic, cloistered existence 
in the mirrored chamber of her mother’s New York apartment appears to 
regressively take women’s film and the representation of women in film (and 
their desire) backwards, for it would seem improbable that such a figure of 
sexual naïveté could exist in post-feminist times; as one critic put it, the film 
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should have been classified as horror because it animates an “age-old story” of 
woman and the “misogynistic” male-gaze rather than a “progressive” female 
journey, “the story of a whole woman.”33 Yet the film is, I suggest, a shining 
example of neo-noir preoccupations with female desire; feminist critical response 
to Black Swan therefore show us where feminist knowledge inhibits what Rose 
advocates in the exploration of a woman’s desire—however “dark” it may be.34 
 Rose implies that Monroe understood her function in Mulvey’s theory—that 
a woman’s role in classical narrative film is “to-be-looked-at,” where “women are 
simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong 
visual and erotic impact” such that she “holds the look, plays to and signifies 
male desire.”35 That is, Monroe is said to have understood “the difference 
between gazing and looking” because “‘Men do not see me’ she is reported as 
having once said, ‘they just lay their eyes on me’.”36 This is certainly suggestive of 
Lacan’s distinction between the function of the eye and the gaze—“mustn’t we 
distinguish between the function of the eye and that of the gaze?”—because the 
gaze is invested as a partial drive: “[t]he eye and the gaze—this is for us the split 
in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field.”37 As Themi notes, 
then, the gaze thus becomes part of the “perennial” field of the subject’s libidinal 
drives in the “genital organization”: oral, anal, and invocatory.38 But while Monroe 
may have understood the fundamental difference between (functional) looking 
and the (eroticized) gaze, it is hard to see (from what anecdotal evidence exists) 
if she understood where this relates to a more common structure than simply 
what came to be known as Mulvey’s male gaze. Part two of Mulvey’s theory—
that however pleasurable the gaze can also threaten in its reminder of an earlier 
castration around which pleasure in looking is fetishistically structured—follows 
Lacan’s observations that the gaze can induce anxiety, for where the gaze is 
linked to a partial drive, it recalls an original split that is replicated in the splitting 
off from the functional eye and the libidinally invested gaze: as Lacan puts it, “[t]
he gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, symbolic 
of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust of our experience, namely, the lack 
that constitutes castration anxiety.”39 Mulvey’s theory emphasizes the way in 
which a woman’s “to-be-looked-at-ness” in narrative film functions as a reminder 
of this castration; yet the continued common usage of Mulvey’s original concept 
in public discourse, social media, and the classroom often comes to signify 
something more than simply a (heterosexual) male viewing position in which a 
woman is fetishistically invested as the object of the camera’s gaze. That is, the 
concept is deployed politically to defend at the level of personal affect, where 
the “male gaze” can come to refer to a fantasy of an all-powerful gaze that 
punishes and torments: a gaze, I suggest, that metonymically comes to stand in 
for a ferocious primal father, as I will go on to explain.
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 Strikingly, Black Swan dramatizes the problem of sublimation versus 
repression of libidinal investment. Its protagonist Nina (Natalie Portman), is 
confronted with the task of revising an earlier repression in order to dance 
both the idealized figure of femininity of Odette, and the erotic seductress of 
Odile. A central yet small scene in the film stages the problem of the gaze for 
Nina at the heart of this libidinal crisis: while catching the train late one night, 
an older, well-dressed man makes a masturbatory gesture in her direction 
and she is shocked to be caught in the erotic gaze of the Other. The scene is 
significant for at the meta-level of the film it stages the precise mechanisms of 
Nina’s psychoses, which operates around the problem of eroticism—the Real of 
the drives—signaled by the gaze: her psychosis is triggered by a return of the 
repressed Real that has been split-off in her investment in the classical ballerina’s 
purified feminine image. Aronofsky’s film thus draws on the classical ballet world 
to animate the mechanisms of fetishism. Where the erotic drive is repressed, as 
Rose notes in the case of fetishism, “there suddenly emerges on the other side 
high esteem for what was concerned in a specific way with [the initial drive].” 
What Lacan might call the “disgusting” element of sexualisation is split off—that 
is, where the body “presents itself as a parcel of meat”—while a more ascetic 
version of the gaze is “raised to a fetish”:40 Nina heavily invests in mastering the 
(ascetic) feminine form of classical ballet that is the object of many admiring 
gazes, repressing the erotic aspect of the gaze that signals desire and sexual 
difference. 
 At the level of the personal, the film thus animates the anxiety triggered by 
the Real encountered in Lacan’s seminar X, where anxiety is felt in the gaze that 
signals what has been repressed.41 Feminist responses to the film’s articulation 
of this gaze functions to both deflect politically what is felt personally regarding 
the gaze. Nina’s psychosis speaks of a lack of symbolic formalization different to 
that of repression in neurosis, and I do not suggest that a/ny woman’s response 
to the gaze follows this; rather, I suggest, Black Swan metaphorises the problem 
of the gaze for the feminine subject where there is an excessive (moral) force 
or defence against it.42 For a woman, feminism may provide a defence against 
anxiety invoked in the gaze—whether metaphorically animated in film or popular 
culture, real experience, or both. Feminist film reviewers were loud in their 
reaction to the film for its startling animation of the male gaze. As Jacobs put it, 
Black Swan reproduces the terms of the Western male imaginary 
that Irigaray describes and critiques. Woman as passive sexualized 
object. Woman as a mere muse lacking a subject position or desire 
and entirely constructed via male fantasy. Relations between women 
reduced to pathological variants of a mother–daughter bond 
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characterized by merging or hate and competition.43
This oversimplification of the film might suggest to one who had not seen 
it that Nina is not the protagonist of the action (she is), or that the film’s 
cinematography lingers longingly on her “to-be-looked-at-ness” (it does 
not). Indeed, the film is striking for its refusal to ever capture Nina fully in its 
gaze: much of the camera-work hovers just over Nina’s shoulder, giving us her 
subjective point of view. Jacobs’ response (like many others) is thus, over-
determined by feminist theory that is not accurate in its address to the way 
the film creates a very uneasy gaze that is ultimately one of Nina’s psychic 
instability. Rather, feminist critics such as Jacobs reacted at a political (feminist 
theoretical) level with the personal disgust of Nina in the film when confronted 
with the eroticism signaled in the gaze of the Other. This particular deployment 
works, I suggest, to defend against the problem of the Other’s gaze: specifically, 
the anxiety induced when caught in the gaze of the Other that is a reminder of 
the (Real) sexual realm so keenly reduced to social convention within feminist 
discourse and just as adamantly repressed, as Soler notes, in efforts towards 
making social spaces “unisexual” and thus equal.44 That is to say, where film 
eloquently stages anxiety signaled in the sexual gaze, it does so because the 
Real of the sex has been repressed: responses to the film thus denote an anxiety 
in response to what the film makes manifest—the unresolved problem of the 
sexual in feminist theory. Jacobs further argues that the film’s exploration of a 
female Oedipal drama through conventional cinematic tropes was “laughable” if 
not “obscene” to contemporary audiences.45 This “obsceneness” that is defended 
against through feminist theory might be better understood through Williams’ 
term, on-scene, which is “the gesture by which a culture brings on to its public 
arena the very organs, acts, bodies, and pleasures that have heretofore been 
designated ob/scene and kept literally off-scene.”46 Black Swan’s ultimate crime 
then is to have put the psychosexual disturbances of a modern female subject 
on-scene, where many would rather not confront it. 
 Moreover, the film speaks to the particular in its animation of the gaze. The 
female dancer’s body is not a universal metaphor for Woman: it is singular type 
of woman, a highly crafted, artificial body consolidated through two centuries 
of institutionalized technique to personify an imaginary feminine form. The film 
does not romanticize this artificial femininity, but shows where its ascetic excess 
is tragic. What manifests in the feminist mobilization of the male gaze—at least 
in this instance—then, is, I suggest, the fantasy produced through a hysterical 
discourse. What Jacobs’ critique (as a condensation of many feminist critiques 
of the film and others like it) denotes, is a fantasy of patriarchy in the form of 
a punishing primal father, and a fantasy of Woman—pure innocent victim of 
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this primal father—in the universal. The totalizing “Western male imaginary” of 
Jacob’s critique—a synonym for patriarchy’s “male gaze”—suggests a figure of 
“primal omnipotence” like the primal father fantasized by Freud.47 For example, 
many feminist descriptions of the film’s central male figure, the ballet director 
Thomas (Vincent Cassel) whose gaze Nina particularly wants to excite, are 
suggestive this omnipotence of a primal father who is “misogynistic,” “punitive,” 
and “sadistic” in his “refined cruelties.” As Themi observes, when Lacan critiques 
Freud’s primal Father myth (of Totem and Taboo) in seminar XVII, he identifies 
a hysterical fantasy at its base, where the idea of a mythical originary father 
cut down by his sons in order to share the women the father was hording (and 
thus instituting the law) is nothing but a “confusion of cause and consequence”: 
Freud “revers[es] the causal sequence” of the law “when he engenders out of 
the discontents with the law imposed by civilization a fantasy of omnipotence, 
of having all the power and sexual activity one can muster.”48 In many instances, 
this is the fantasy of the “male gaze” that is launched in feminist critical 
discourse, where ‘male’ becomes a synonym for a sadistic father/master figure.  
 Politically, Mulvey argues, the male gaze puts Woman at the service of 
man’s castration anxiety: “the look, pleasurable in form, can be threatening in 
context” because it is structured on an earlier experience of castration, and 
Woman is the “representation/image that crystallizes this paradox.”49 I want to 
suggest, however, that despite protestations there is a jouissance in mobilizing 
Mulvey’s theory: where it is mounted politically in public discourse it might 
be compared to a hysteric’s enjoyment, in the satisfaction of (theoretically) 
producing/fantasizing a patriarchal master only to reveal his castration while 
enjoying one’s own privation in being the apparently passive (helpless) object 
of this drama.50 That is to say, the “male gaze” is deployed primarily as a mode 
of experiencing jouissance counter to the mode suggested in the concept itself: 
the jouissance of privation in being (metaphorically) reduced to the mode of the 
others enjoyment. Such fantasies might be prefaced in Mulvey’s original essay, 
where she explicitly states that in “analyzing pleasure, or beauty,” the result is 
“destruction” which is “the intention of this article”: to dismantle and “attack” 
the “satisfaction and reinforcement of the ego that represent the high point 
of film history.”51 Yet, as Black Swan illustrates, the ballerina is required to not 
simply embody an object of (ascetic) femininity for the gaze of the viewer, one 
must excite the gaze—a task that is far from passive. Where Mulvey emphasizes 
“pleasure in looking” as “split between active/male and passive/female” feminist 
critics tend to avoiding engaging with the structure of this pleasure, underlying 
a certain enjoyment in the helplessness of being the object, as if one simply 
was the object of fantasy without having any role or action in it. The attraction 
of Mulvey’s theory may be to some, then, what Lacan notes drives the hysteric: 
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“what matters to her is that that other called a man know what a precious object 
she becomes in this context.”52 Here, as Lacan notes, “the neurotic’s fantasy is 
entirely situated in the locus of the other”53 and is “striking” for its function of 
“defending” the subject “against anxiety.”54 Nevertheless, as Lacan goes on to 
observe, the neurotic’s fantasy, “is also, contrary to all appearances, the bait 
with which they hold onto the Other.”55 When applied to the feminist use of 
the “male gaze” then, we see a similar hysterical reaction that defends against 
anxiety signaled in the gaze through the fantasy of a primal father—a master—
who is essential to the defence. The structure is similar in understandings of an 
emerging ‘female gaze’ in popular films such as Thelma & Louise and The Hunger 
Games trilogy, where a “female vantage point” is mobilized to “encourage a 
questioning of patriarchal power.”56
What does feminism want when it comes to signify what a woman 
wants?
I have elsewhere suggested that where feminism forms a new master discourse—
that is, where feminism’s knowledge product becomes a university discourse in 
Lacan’s formula—it can come to function as a super-ego force equivalent to that 
held by religion.57 Here, feminism operates as a new canon—what Bracher calls 
“establishment pedagogy”—that one is inculcated into and asked to master.58 
As a master discourse, feminism can function pedagogically like ideology, 
and I suggest that where students are interpellated by feminist theory they 
can become inhibited in their the ability to perceive other ways of thinking. 
Russell observes, for example, that in the clinic identity bearing signifiers in the 
symbolic that a subject might be “encouraged to assume” and “fasten” their 
identity around, can provide assurance in the belief that the symbolic signifier 
“tells her about what she is” but, ultimately, such identifications can stagnate 
the progress of analysis where they form a regressive defense against the 
real truth the subject is seeking in analysis regarding their suffering.59 More 
than simply obfuscating access to an individual particular truth of being, I 
want to suggest that where Feminism becomes a university discourse—as an 
apparently rational force of enlightenment thinking—it can function as a super-
ego injunction. Where the super-ego takes its energy from an individual turning 
their own aggression inwards, Themi observes that Freud’s understanding of 
the super-ego equates to a form of Nietzschean “bad conscience” because both 
operate as forms of “internalized aggression.”60 And Themi follows Zupančič 
in linking this operation to a “mode of enjoyment” experienced “in the whole 
history of Christianity.”61 Feminism’s inheritance of a religious function is not 
coincidental. As I have noted elsewhere, feminism is structured around a moral 
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good that takes on the inflationary qualities of a sovereign Good over-invested 
in ideals at the expense of knowledge of the drives, not the least because, 
as Paglia has argued, “feminism, like all liberal movements of the past two 
hundred years, is heir to Rousseau.”62 The problem is twofold in that, feminist 
knowledge production is generated through liberal Enlightenment thinking 
that, in Rousseauean tradition, presumes a fundamental innocence beneath 
socially (patriarchal) corruptive forces. This is Paglia’s point in Sexual Personae, 
that the darker—that is, amoral—qualities of “[s]exuality and eroticism” may be 
shaped by different historical institutions, but “[f]eminists grossly oversimplify 
the problem” by reducing sex “to a matter of social convention” and attempt to 
“readjust society” by “eliminat[ing] sexual inequality.63 
 The emphasis in feminist theory on ‘undoing’ patriarchal structures (such 
as the male gaze) where they are perceived to enforce female victimhood 
functions subtly at the level of morality akin to a Judeo-Christian slave-revolt. 
Russell follows Nietzsche’s work on the structure of Christian pity (given to 
their Roman masters and “persecutors”) to observe that it goes beyond simply 
redressing a perceived power imbalance to a reversal of the terms of value 
judgments.64 In a simple reversal of power, the persecutor “is forced to assume 
a position in which he has done something that incurs guilt, something not just 
bad but ‘evil’” such that “forgiveness constitutes an exercise of domination” 
over the persecutor.65  More importantly, this produces a “reversal of positions 
from which value might be evaluated in the first place”: the subject deemed to 
be “evil” is made to assume an “ignorance as to some ultimate, transcendental 
law according to which the value ought to be assigned” and consequently 
asked to “reflect upon itself” as criminal while the “suffering” of the Christian is 
“elevated to the status of universal moral virtue.”66 Where feminism becomes a 
moral virtue that offers a defence against the persecutory gaze, it might be said 
to perform a super-ego function of a “moral conscience” that Freud theorizes 
comes to “censor” the individual’s dreams and fantasies.67 A woman’s enjoyment 
in the gaze—enjoyment in being an erotic object—is largely overlooked by 
feminist theorists as it is seen to be a form of imitation of the status quo: to be 
“seduced” into thinking that “patriarchy is pleasurable.”68 The prominence of 
feminist discourse and theories in Western cultures may provide (to greater or 
lesser extent, depending on the particularity of the individual’s engagement 
with such discourses) a moral groundwork for the super-ego that, Freud puts 
it, “gathers up from the influences of the environment the demands which that 
environment makes upon the ego”69 and, thus, functions as a form of moral 
censorship over any possible jouissance in the feminine position where it may 
be in conflict with super-ego demands. This will equally depend on the mother-
transference that feminism forms for the individual, as Freud notes, the super-
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ego reveals “its origin in the influence of superior powers, and above all of 
parents.”70 The subject is faced with the dilemma: “[s]hould it or should it not 
submit itself to the half-conscious, paradoxical, and morbid command of the 
superego[?]”71  
 We see this animated in Black Swan through the figure of Nina’s 
mother (Barbara Hershey) in an equally important scene. Nina wakes in her 
childish bedroom and begins masturbating before she is startled to realize 
her mother is in the room with her. There is some ambiguity in the scene, as 
Nina’s subjective vision is edited to suggest that the mother’s presence may be 
merely a hallucination in Nina’s unraveling psychosis; regardless of the mother’s 
actual presence or absence from the scene, however, we see the significance 
of her presence in Nina’s psyche, as a prohibiting (moral) force that inhibits 
Nina’s attempt at erotic discovery (the structure of which is repeated in a later 
scene when the actual mother inhibits Nina’s potentially hallucinatory sexual 
encounter). Indeed, it is easy to see how Black Swan is “obscene” to feminist 
critics for presuming of a number of psychoanalytic frameworks in the logic 
of its plot that run counter to contemporary feminist thought that has long 
abandoned psychoanalytic engagements. This sense of having “overcome” 
regressive theory is expected to be recognized in popular film and media 
cultures. In feminist criticism of the film’s exploration of female desire caught 
up in Oedipal dramas and the anxiety of the sexual gaze, offer a symptomatic 
rejection of precisely what Rose would have feminism confront. That is, the 
film shows us where contemporary gender politics excessively rely on an ideal 
relation to gendered identity and representation, anchored in what has become 
the feminist ‘Good’: positive representations of ideal, ideologically progressive 
female characters. It is the sexual component of Nina’s psychosis—its repression 
and distorted return—that animates what is “unspeakable” to contemporary 
feminist discourses—what it “sanitizes”—and therefore, exactly what a feminist 
must confront. Here, psychoanalysis in praxis is useful in asking what feminism 
wants when it comes to signify what a woman wants, because it may assist a 
woman in identifying what feminism asks it submit to—a “paradoxical, and cruel 
command”72—that keeps one in ignorance of desire.
Concluding thoughts: Does Feminism Exist?
In seminar XX, Lacan makes a controversial statement, that Woman, capital ‘W’ 
does not exist, writing it Woman, and feminists informed by poststructuralist 
thought might agree, yet many seem reluctant to abandon the signifier 
feminism where it constitutes the work and aims of this Woman. Such a 
signifier—Feminism—and the knowledge it presupposes supports the imaginary 
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relationship formed between the subject and knowledge. Althusser’s definition 
of ideology might be applied here, to express the relationship between a 
woman and feminism: like ideology, feminism functions to structure “the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence,”73 or 
more precisely, feminist knowledge gives meaning to if not quilts the subject’s 
structure by expressing an imaginary relation to the sexual conditions of 
existence. Jacobs’ critique of the “Western Male Imaginary” (and others like 
it) assumes that, if women were not represented within it and were allowed 
to represent themselves on screen, they would be nothing but pure and 
virtuous, without jealousy, competition, anxiety or, indeed, sexual being—as 
Willoughby puts, in the feminist utopia, Black Swan would “a progressive film 
with a positive, young woman-centered journey out of repression at its center,” 
“a whole woman” with “a healthy, multi-faceted sexuality,” and a successful 
career.74 Themi notes this fantasy of woman often found in feminist theory is 
the universal Woman Lacan speaks of in seminar XX, “‘Woman’ as the universal 
purity of innocence or victimhood” who, Lacan famously puts it, “doesn’t exist.”75 
This statement goes further, Themi notes, towards Lacan’s “thesis of the ‘not-
whole’ and lack of a ‘sexual relationship,’ of which he remarks, ‘what do you 
expect?—if the sexual relationship doesn’t exist, there aren’t any ladies’.”76 Lacan 
thus notes that the hysteric fantasizes a master in part, to resolve their question 
regarding sexual difference “which is precisely the impossible.”77 Quackelbeen et 
al. further note that even where the “no sexual relation” is felt, such information 
in no way stops the hysteric from “dreaming of the contrary” that “there is no 
sexual relation, but there should be one” because it is essential for a notion of 
sexual equality.78 Yet efforts towards equality in terms of power and status are 
in contrast to Monroe’s questioning and in this she offers a lasting lesion for 
feminism for as Rose observes, in confronting the “the worst” of her life Monroe 
never exchanged suffering for “a counter affirmation of power.”79 In searching 
for one’s particular truth—what motivates and may in turn be inhibited by 
feminist discourse and theory—one must consider the impossibility of Feminism 
(capital ‘F’) as a discourse of truths. For the aims of this Feminism continue to 
institute the fantasy of Woman: whole, virtuous, and victimized. Indeed, as Themi 
notes of Lacan’s famous Woman, if Woman does not exist, how can Feminism? 
That is, might we not hold a better relationship towards feminism (lower-case 
‘f’)—develop a more appropriate distance towards feminist ideas and thought, 
and free feminist agendas towards more productive aims and purposes—by 
articulating Feminism as not existing?80
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